In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein maintains we should tend to philosophical problems by "looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them"(PI § 109).  Thus, the philosopher's task, he seems to suggest, consists entirely in clearing away misunderstandings (PI § 90).  Let us provisionally follow notable interpreters (Pears, Baker, Diamond, Conant) in taking Wittgenstein to think of philosophy as therapy, or taking him to subscribe to a therapeutic conception of philosophy.
 I wish to investigate the nature of Wittgenstein's claim to philosophy as therapy and the tension this claim at least seems to create in the later Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy.  This tension, which Michael Hymers very briefly discusses in his 2010 book, Wittgenstein and the Practice of Philosophy, arises between the generality and anti-essentialism of Wittgenstein's method (Hymers 215).  Suppose Wittgenstein's claim that "philosophy undoes grammatical confusions" is analytic.  The worry, here, is that Wittgenstein may merely have coined a term of art; what he takes to be a philosophical problem is just any problem which can be (dis)solved by his methods.  (Consequently, we begin to wonder what justification Wittgenstein has for claiming the problems of philosophy – as we understand 'philosophy' – are the same problems which interest him.)  This is the problem of generality.  Now, suppose Wittgenstein is not defining philosophy as therapy; instead, he is making a synthetic claim about the nature of philosophy.  This, too, presents a difficulty, because Wittgenstein then makes a very unWittgensteinian move by admitting philosophical problems are essentially of one sort: problems arising out of a certain kind of misunderstanding.  However, as Hymers notes, "consistent application of Wittgenstein's techniques should keep us open to the possibility that 'philosophy', like 'number' and 'game' and 'language' and 'women', is a family-resemblance concept"(215).  I call this the problem of anti-essentialism. 
As it stands, I plan to argue Wittgenstein's method is not general but does not necessarily face a generality problem.  More precisely, I plan to argue the method Wittgenstein proposes is not general insofar as it is therapeutic, and what counts as an adequate therapy depends on the patient.  Interpreters such as David Pears have argued Wittgenstein provides sustained discussion of a variety of topics across his early and later work with the goal of purging us of certain troubling ways we have of relating to the world.  In The False Prison, for instance, Pears draws attention to Wittgenstein's treatment of language concerning the subject, solipsism, the mind, and mental phenomena over his life.  In my paper, I plan to examine the particular case of Wittgenstein's remarks on the subject of expressions such as "A thinks that p" in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, The Blue and Brown Books, and the Investigations.  I will argue for a reading of these remarks on which Wittgenstein presents an alternative way of thinking of the subject or mind as part of a therapeutic process.
It is crucial, here, that I take Wittgenstein to offer us better as opposed to the right ways of thinking of the mind and its related concepts.  Wittgenstein argues looking at things one way as opposed to another by using different 'pictures' (PI § 144) makes a difference in our lives (Lectures on Religious Belief I).  This notion will be central to my paper, as I will take Wittgenstein's therapies to be intended specifically for those who experience the "bewitchment of [their] intelligence by means of language"(PI § 109) – in particular, bewitchments with which Wittgenstein himself was acquainted.  I will argue this reading of Wittgenstein's method as therapeutic and personal in nature also helps explain his remark in the preface of the Tractatus that his "book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it – or similar thoughts"(TLP 27).  I also hope to connect my paper with Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein's work and its relation to psychoanalysis.

Also, here's a picture of a cat that snuck into my old apartment (well, maaaaaybe I let it in...) and promptly jumped onto the bed.

I moved to Amsterdam yesterday.  My new place is all bright white, steel and concrete on the inside.  The outside's charcoal-stained wood (with huge orange room numbers.)  I've listened to "Oslo in the Summertime" on repeat since I arrived.  I've resolved to explore Europe this summer, but am proper torn.  ESSLLI's in Copenhagen this year, the ALWS conference calls, and I could move to Berlin for a month to take an intensive German course.  Scandinavia?  Wittgenstein country?  The "Montreal of Europe"?  What would you pick?

Matthew Wampler-Doty is writing a thesis on an epistemic logic he developed (Evidentialist Logic.)  I thought you guys would appreciate these (click to enlarge):


That's it for now.  Stories, eventually.

I know, I know... it's been forever and I've left you in the dark.  I promise, posts are coming!

In the meantime: http://dengels.blogspot.com

This is my bike, which I bought from Robert at Waterlooplein yesterday.  Loré guessed I'd name it "CTRLcycle" (which, I assume, would be pronounced so as to rhyme with "popsicle"), since once upon a time, I had a bright blue Saturn Ion which Tam christened "The CTRL Ship".  So, CTRLcycle it is.

Is it inappropriate of me to say that middle-aged Dutch men have the cutest accents in the world?  They sound like there are soap bubbles and rubber duckies bobbing along with their words.  When Robert was selling me this bike, I couldn't help but smile the whole time.  I feel the same way when listening to my inquisitive semantics professor, Jeroen Groenendijk (though, I'll admit, Groenendijk is 50% more entertaining because he spends half of our seminar pretending to ask whether someone is going to a party.)  I've told Tarek I wish I could keep Groenendijk in a box in my pocket, so I could pull him out and hear him ask, "Will Maaaary go to the paaaaarty?" whenever I want.  Yeah, that sounds pretty patronizing, doesn't it.

Anyway, if you ever need a bike in Amsterdam: go to the Waterlooplein flea market.  Talk to Robert and see for yourself. :)

So, here are some more photos.  The first is of the Pauzeruimte in the ILLC.  It's my favourite room, ever.  The second is a photo I took at Bagels & Beans, a bagel restaurant near city hall.  They offer beautifully simple fresh mint tea.  It's exactly what you'd expect -- a ton of mint leaves in hot water.  The last is a photo of pigeons at my front door (one's really pretty!)  All photos are clickable to embiggen (as it were.)